PHYSICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF A WOMAN’S BODY: RIGHT TO ABORTION, A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN INDIAN AND AUSTRALIAN LAWS

Abstract

The font of the abstract and rest of the manuscript should be in Times New Roman Reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity constitute fundamental human rights, grounded in principles of dignity, privacy, and personal liberty. Every individual possesses the inherent right to make decisions concerning their own body, particularly regarding reproductive matters such as abortion and contraception. However, the physical sovereignty of pregnant persons remains perpetually contested by legal frameworks that seek to balance reproductive rights against state interests in potential fetal life. This paper examines abortion jurisprudence through a comparative analysis of Indian and Australian legal regimes, tracing the evolution of reproductive rights via judicial precedents and employing the Reproductive Justice Framework to establish abortion as a fundamental right.

In India, the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution constitutes a foundational fundamental right. The right to abortion is anchored in constitutional guarantees of privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity. Conversely, Australia's Federal Constitution lacks a dedicated chapter on fundamental rights; instead, legal protections encompassing socio-economic and civic-political freedoms derive from fragmented sources, including the Principle of Legality and state and territory human rights charters. Comparative analysis reveals that India's Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, despite recent progressive amendments, maintains a provider-centric structure that undermines decisional autonomy. In contrast, Australia's decentralized decriminalization model produces geographic fragmentation and unequal access to reproductive services. This paper explores the emotional, ethical, and legal dimensions of reproductive autonomy through landmark jurisprudence, including Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India (2017), X v. Union of India (2016), Sarmishtha Chakraborty v. Union of India (2017), and R v. Davidson (1969).

From the author's perspective, pregnant persons should possess autonomous decision-making authority regarding abortion. As fetal development occurs within the pregnant person's body, the ultimate decision to continue or terminate pregnancy must remain exclusively with the pregnant individual. This paper concludes by addressing the necessity for clearly defined abortion laws that uphold bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy, offering recommendations to address ethical challenges that impede reproductive freedom.